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Air dominance was the strength of Western 
military powers from the early 1990s until the 
mid-2010s. The proliferation of air defence 
systems, notably Russian S300 and S400 
missile systems, has created a major challenge. 
This is the reason why acquiring an up-to-date 
combat air system is crucial to restore the level 
playing field. Europeans seem to have become 
aware of the stakes, but they respond in a 
scattered manner. 
 
The states of Europe appear unable to converge 
towards a single project for the future combat air 
system. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Sweden 
collaborate on Tempest (and the next generation 
of the Gripen), while France, Germany, and 
Spain work together on the Future Combat Air 
System (FCAS). Meanwhile, the F-35 community 
is growing in Europe, and could constitute a third 
option if and when the United States launches the 
development of a sixth-generation aircraft. One 
has to ask whether this fragmentation is 
sustainable at both the domestic and the 
European level. 
 
Combat air systems are one of the most symbolic 
defence capabilities, especially for arms-
producing countries. However, the acquisition of 
these capabilities appears less and less affordable 
on a purely national basis. Pooling efforts 
between the largest possible number of allies is 
the obvious solution. Yet France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK already failed to develop a new 
generation of fighter aircraft together in the past, 
when France opted out of the Eurofighter project 
and eventually developed the Rafale aircraft alone 
in the 1980s.1 Should we fear history repeating 
itself? Or could the transformation of technology 
and manufacturing favour another way of 
cooperating, which would avoid the traditional 
limitations of armament cooperation? 
 
THE ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS OF 
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMMES  
European arms-producing countries are 
confronted with a paradox. Maintaining a 
domestic defence industrial base constitutes a 
prerequisite to achieve sovereignty, but since the 
end of the Cold War a purely domestic industry 
has become less and less sustainable. Limited 
budgets combined with the rising cost of 
advanced defence systems should push the states 
 
 





of Europe to enlarge the market for any major 
defence capability by pooling their efforts, so that 
between them they can reach the required critical 
mass. 
 
In any case, the cost of future combat air systems 
appears prohibitive for almost all arms-producing 
countries. Beyond the United States, China, and 
maybe Russia, no country can afford such a 
programme on a purely domestic basis. The 
Rafale programme cost €43 billion, while the 
trilateral FCAS should require up to €80 billion, 
and that is a conservative estimate.2 Tempest 
similarly would require core funding of more than 
£25 billion (€28 billion).3   
 
This cost escalation reflects significant 
technological improvements. However, the 
resulting operational advantages come with 
higher and higher unit costs, because outstanding 
performance relies on expensive inputs, complex 
architectures, and challenging systems 
engineering. This trend creates a vicious circle: 
higher unit costs result in smaller fleets, which 
further raises the unit cost as economies of scale 
vanish. Cost escalation is not specific to combat 
aircraft, but a global trend for major capabilities, 
ranging from 5 to 12 percent per year on average 
over the last half century.4    
 
Furthermore, acquiring a new capability 
constitutes just one part of the equation. Armed 
forces can secure their strategic autonomy only if 
the domestic industrial base is sustainable in the 
long run. Indeed, providing air forces with the 
capabilities they need goes far beyond the initial 
delivery. Defence industry must be able to 
support combat air systems throughout their 
decades-long lifecycle by maintaining, upgrading, 
or renewing in-service fleets. For instance, early 
studies for the Rafale took place in the mid-
1970s, while the French Air Force will 
decommission the last aircraft in the late 2060s. 
Eurofighter, F-35, or any other combat aircraft 
has a similar lifecycle. 
 
A sustainable and innovative industrial base is a 
condition sine qua non for guaranteeing strategic 
autonomy. This requires maintaining a sufficient 
flow of activities over time to preserve the arms-
producing countries’ competences and skills in 
design and manufacturing. This was already 
difficult to achieve for the generation of 
Eurofighter and Rafale, with an average annual 
production rate of just above ten for each 
participating country. Exports can complement 
this, but such complementary orders are 
unpredictable, and often insufficient to reach the 
appropriate level of production evenly 
throughout a platform’s lifecycle. 
 




A cooperative programme seems the only way of 
maintaining an effective and comprehensive 
defence-industrial base on European soil, the UK 
included. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that 
domestic industry can deliver effective and 
affordable capabilities and related support. 
Europeans would be well advised to resolve this 
challenge between them, since any project shared 
with the US will very likely be structurally 
unbalanced, in view of the huge asymmetry in 









EUROPE AS THE RIGHT LEVEL FOR A 
SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRY 
Since the 1970s, Europeans have increasingly 
resorted to cooperative programmes to fulfil their 
capability needs as well as to preserve a domestic 
technological and industrial base. Various 
schemes have revealed different shortfalls, 
however: higher R&D and procurement costs than 
expected, delays, unsatisfactory compromises on 
requirements, limited industrial consolidation or 
specialisation between participating countries, etc.  
 
Cooperative programmes can disappoint because 
states are likely to pursue contradictory goals. 
They cooperate to make defence investment 
affordable but, simultaneously, they expect to 
maintain as many activities inside their domestic 
industrial base as possible (through the rule of 
juste retour). While making it easier to gather a large 
number of participating countries, juste retour 
contradicts the reasons for cooperating, and 
results in redundancies that increase the cost of 
programmes and induce weaknesses within the 
European defence technological and industrial 
base. 
 
Nevertheless, cooperative programmes can be 
truly advantageous for all participating states, 
independently from the size of their contribution 
– if they are well conceived and managed 
effectively. R&D costs represent a large share of 
any major programme. Cooperating countries 
could share these sunk costs. In addition, pooling 
orders can increase production series and reduce 
unit costs through economies of scale and higher 
productivity. The cooperation on armoured 
vehicles between Germany and the Netherlands 
(Boxer) and between Belgium and France 
(CaMo) provides a perfect illustration of these 
benefits. Thus, disappointment with past 
cooperative programmes should not prevent 
Europeans from exploring innovative ways for 
future cooperation. 
This certainly applies to future combat air 
systems. There simply is not enough room for 
two or more competing programmes in Europe. 
Meanwhile, it is also very unlikely that the two 
existing projects could merge, and recruit other 
European countries. However, a third way is 
possible, pooling efforts between both projects 
to a certain extent. Brexit should not be allowed 
to stand in the way of such cooperation, nor 
should other countries that would be interested 
in joining a collective dynamic, like Poland or 
Belgium, be excluded. 
 
The institutional tools to make this possible exist. 
Even though a single programme is unlikely, the 
creation of the European Defence Fund 
constitutes an opportunity to develop a shared 
technological and industrial base in Europe. The 
fact is that the ecosystem of defence has 
undergone deep changes, which opens up the 
way for a more creative approach to European 
cooperation – more flexible and more scalable to 
the potential contribution of each participating 
country. It may not be necessary, therefore, as it 
was the case before, to unite all interested states 
in a single programme. 
 
INDUSTRY 4.0: NEW WAYS OF COOPERATION? 
 Two technological evolutions also provide 
fruitful ground for cooperation on future combat 
air systems in Europe: on the one hand, such 
systems are much more than just another aircraft; 
on the other hand, the fourth industrial 
revolution (Industry 4.0) creates a world of 
opportunities to imagine new modes of 
cooperation. 
 
First, a future combat air system is not merely a 
new combat aircraft, but a system of systems, 
composed of various types of manned and 
unmanned aircraft as well as flying objects, 
including remote carriers and missiles. Such 
configuration opens room for a contribution by 
 
 





any interested country, which was more difficult 
before, when cooperative programmes used to 
concern a single large complex weapon system. 
 
Historically, the increased complexity of 
advanced combat aircraft was the main driver of 
cost escalation. In order to keep this trend under 
control, armed forces have conceived multi-
mission platforms. This “one fits all” approach 
led to the replacement of several platforms by just 
one. The Rafale, for example, is able to perform 
the tasks of 5 to 7 earlier types of aircraft. 
However, a platform that performs more and 
more tasks becomes very expensive to develop, 
produce and support. Rather than stop cost 
escalation, this strategy ended up nurturing it, 
thus confirming "Augustine’s Law".6 
 
The concept of a system of systems makes an 
alternative strategy possible, since it is no longer 
necessary to integrate all capacities into one 
platform. Different components of the combat 
air system can be developed separately from a 
technical, industrial and geographical point of 
view. It is not necessary for all countries to agree 
on a single product, but only on a shared base. 
Each country and its industry can then participate 
according to its own competences and 
expectations in the field of design and 
production. This change of concept is an 
opportunity to invent new modalities for 
cooperation. 
 
Second, Industry 4.0 provides the technological 
means to implement such a disruptive approach 
to cooperation. Manufacturing has greatly 
evolved since the late 1990s when the F-35, the 
most recent combat aircraft, was conceived. It is 
now possible to go beyond the logics of the third 
industrial revolution (Fordism), which required 
large volumes of a standardised production to 
minimise unit costs. 
 
Thanks to the digital transformation and 
“additive manufacturing”,7 it is now possible to 
produce short series at an affordable cost, and to 
abandon a logic of verticalised and centralised 
production for cooperative programmes. 
Different countries can therefore work together 
on a programme while keeping a significant part 
of the production on their national territory, 
which would make it possible to combine 
cooperation and strategic autonomy. The 
Tempest and FCAS projects offer limited 
opportunities for industrial participation from 
countries with a more limited defence industrial 
base. Nevertheless, this new technological 
ecosystem can keep programmes open for 
eventual contributions from countries that do not 
position themselves as system integrators, such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, or Poland. 
 
Finally, these new tools also offer the means to 
maintain or even develop long-term strategic 
autonomy for European countries. Thanks to the 
reduction in production series, it is possible to 
introduce innovations more regularly and to 
implement a logic of upward spiral development. 
This creates an opportunity to adapt in-service 
fleets as best as possible to a given country’s 




Today’s technological and manufacturing 
ecosystem provides opportunities to combine 
national strategic autonomy and European 
cooperation without painful compromises. 
Countries could share R&D costs for a joint 
project while managing production domestically, 
focusing on economics of scope rather than of 
scale, helping to overcome the contradictions 
experienced in previous cooperative 
programmes. European countries have a major 
opportunity to both reinvent cooperative 
programmes and improve their domestic and 
 
 





collective strategy autonomy by working together 
to develop the next generation of combat air 
systems. 
 
This possible new configuration constitutes a 
chance to really move forward a true European 
defence technological and industrial base, in 
which each country can define a niche position, 
without requiring a constraining “big 
programme” frame or industrial consolidation 
detrimental to its domestic industrial interests. 
Such configuration could represent a game-
changer in the field of cooperative programmes, 
in particular for countries like Belgium that focus 
on specific niches. 
 
As Karl Marx noted in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Napoleon (1852), “Hegel remarks 
somewhere that all great world-historic facts and 
personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot 
to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time 
as farce”. We could hope that the United 
Kingdom, France and their European partners 
will this time prove Marx wrong regarding the 
ability of Europeans to develop together the next 
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